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Bryan James Matis
Faculty Advisor: N.K. Chidambaran

Abstract
The 2007-2008 financial crisis was a pervasive shock that profoundly
impacted the financial services industry. Often described as the worst
economic crisis since the Great Depression, this event provides a unique
opportunity to examine the consequences experienced by members of
boards of directors and top management at bank holding companies for
what shareholders may perceive as failures in oversight and excessive
risk-taking. This study examines whether shareholders penalized top
management at banks and provides some new evidence of the crisis’s
impact on management careers. Using the 36 largest American bank
holding corporations by assets as a sample, we examine director
re-election percentages and other director, management, and firm
characteristics to determine the extent to which shareholders indicate
their disapproval of banks’ boards of directors during and after the
financial crisis. By employing various methods of empirical analysis,
including ordinary least squares regressions, two-sample t-tests,
and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, we have determined with statistical
confidence that the average number of shareholder votes in favor of
bank director nominees decreased significantly at the end of and in
the years immediately following the financial crisis. Further, we find
that much of this decrease in shareholder approval can be attributed to
several firm, board, and director-specific characteristics. These results
have important corporate governance policy implications and may
suggest additional avenues of exploration regarding this or other such
industry-wide or macroeconomic crises.
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I. Introduction
The 2007-2008 financial crisis is often attributed to failures of
oversight and excessive risk-taking on the part of bank holding
companies in the United States and around the world. Politicians, the
media, and members of social movements like Occupy Wall Street,
for example, accuse the leadership of major domestic banks of not
being held sufficiently responsible or penalized for their perceived role
in precipitating the crisis. U.S. President Barack Obama, in a news
conference on Thursday, October 6, 2011, said of this perception, “You’re
still seeing some of the same folks [bankers] who acted irresponsibly
trying to fight efforts to crack down on abusive practices that got us into
this problem in the first place” (Salazar and Zraick, 2011). A thorough
investigation of the consequences actually experienced by the leaders
of the American financial services sector following the crisis may
therefore inform these continuing conversations and yield important
policy implications.
The history of the financial crisis provides insight into the need for
such a study. Yeoh (2009) provides a helpful summary of the event. The
origin of the crisis is traced to late 2006 and early 2007, when housing
prices in the United States experienced a sudden and dramatic decline.
This collapse in turn prompted several banks in the United States and
Europe, especially those with high exposure to the property markets, to
post significant losses (Yeoh, 2009, pp. 42-43). Such exposure came in
the form of exotic financial instruments that packaged “toxic” subprime
mortgage securities with less risky assets (Yeoh, 2009, p. 49). These
instruments, despite their risky components, were marketed with
favorable triple-A risk ratings, giving investors a false sense of security.
Such financial instruments are now heavily regulated (Austill, 2011,
p. 66). Thus, the collapse of the housing and debt markets precipitated
substantial and unforeseen financial losses for investors, banks, and
governments across the world. The United States thereafter entered into
an economic recession in late 2008, and although economic conditions
have technically improved somewhat since then, the life savings of
many individuals has yet to be recovered (Yeoh, 2009, p.43). Yeoh (2009)
also observes that regulators, investors, and policy-makers were very
concerned with failures in the governance of banks, especially in the wake
of “emerging [accounts of] corporate misconduct and extreme corporate
adventurism in these failed and failing institutions” (p. 54). Despite
these perceived indiscretions on the part of bank leadership, financial
institutions such as American International Group (AIG), Fannie Mae,
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and Freddie Mac, among others, received controversial bailout funding
or other special assistance from the U.S. federal government (Yeoh,
2009, p. 50). Many banking executives were simultaneously awarded
large severance packages in exchange for resigning from their respective
firms. Yeoh (2009) asserts that the issue of bank executive compensation
could be among “the most important corporate governance failure[s]
of the subprime crisis,” one that may have been triggered in part by
“directors’ failure to effectively challenge” the lavish pay structure of
their firms’ chief executive officers (Yeoh, 2009, 58).
Accordingly, it is clear that many people, from scholars to President
Obama, do not perceive the professional consequences experienced
by bank leadership as commensurate with the negative effects of
the financial crisis and economic recession experienced by society
as a whole. During the crisis, many high-profile firings of CEOs and
other matters of bank leadership and corporate governance were
the subject of countless media inquiries (e.g., Keoun, 2007; Berman,
2008; and Reckard, 2009). Now that the economy of the United
States is beginning to recover, it is possible to examine consequences
experienced by bank boards and management during the crisis with
the benefit of hindsight. Several studies about the nature of director
elections and their implications for management and firm performance
(e.g., Cai, Garner, and Walking, 2009; Kirkpatrick, 2009; and Hermalin
and Weisbach, 2003) will inform such an effort.

II. Literature Review
The existing literature on the topic of governance of large corporations
suggests that the issues explored in this study are timely. Preston
(1990), for instance, observes a positive relationship between the size
of an organization and societal perceptions of social responsibility (p.
369). The top 36 publicly traded American bank holding companies
examined in this study own approximately $13 trillion in assets—a
figure that is quickly approaching the same amount as the United
States’ annual gross domestic product—and serve as the backbone of
the American and global credit markets. Justifiably or not, the public
expects firms of extraordinary size to wield their influence responsibly,
and so may hold such firms responsible for poor macroeconomic
performance. Nonetheless, large firms such as these typically have
complex operations; they are more challenging to oversee, manage,
and control from a governance perspective (Zahra and Pearce, 1989,
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p. 294). How, then, are the shareholders or owners of these firms to
ensure effective governance?
The answer is found with the firm’s board of directors. Regulation
in the United States requires that all publicly traded companies be
overseen by a board of directors elected by the shareholders. Hemalin
and Weisbach (2003) describe a firm’s board as the “equilibrium solution”
to the agency problem that exists between the firm’s shareholders and
managers (p. 10). In this view, because shareholders directly elect the
members of the board, directors act as agents of the shareholders.
The board, on behalf of shareholders, oversees firm management by
providing incentives for executives to act in certain ways (Cai, Garner,
and Walkling, p. 2389). By law, boards must consist of a minimum
number of individuals, meet regularly, form committees, and comply
with various rules regarding group composition (Hemalin and Weisbach,
2003, p. 9). Thus, boards exist both to optimize organizational design
and to comply with regulations. Such regulations exist, in theory, to
protect shareholders and the market at large.
Typically, boards fulfill several roles in the governance of firms.
First, they provide advice and counsel to top management (Adams,
Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010, p. 64). In this sense, directors are
appointed because they possess a particular level of expertise or outlook
that would add value to the firm. Directors are therefore charged with
determining the strategic direction, mission, vision, and corporate
policies of the firm, and providing leadership during crisis situations
(Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010, p. 64). Finally, boards of
directors serve a disciplinary role for the firm in that top management,
along with all firm employees, is held accountable to the board (Adams,
Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010, p. 64).
One of the most important responsibilities of a board of directors
is to change the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO), if necessary.
Firms’ boards are tasked with monitoring the abilities and actions of
top management, continually assessing the value and quality of each
(Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010, p. 65). When the firm does
not perform to the shareholders’ expectations, the board is responsible
for intervening, and, in many cases, replaces the CEO. Hemalin and
Weisbach (2010) observe a strong positive correlation between poor
firm performance and board-induced CEO turnover (p. 14). In scenarios
such as these, board composition plays an important role in the rate of
CEO turnover. Typically, board composition is examined in terms of the
ratio of insider directors to independent directors. Insider directors are
those directors who concurrently serve or have previously served as
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officers or employees of the firm they govern, and are viewed as more
sympathetic to the CEO. Independent directors have no such ties to the
firm, and are perceived as more inclined to replace the CEO and other
top managers in the wake of poor performance. In a board dominated
by insiders, however, CEO turnover decisions are somewhat unrelated
to firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010, p. 11). The insideroutsider ratio is also not correlated with firm performance as a whole
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010, p. 12). Ultimately, the effectiveness of
the board at monitoring firm performance is determined by the board’s
independence, size, and composition (John and Senbet, 1998).
Boards tend to do their work in committees. The board members, often
in conjunction with the CEO, determine who among them will serve on
each board committee. The audit committee assures the integrity of the
firm’s financial statements, oversees the firm’s accounting procedures,
and maintains compliance with relevant laws, policies, and regulations
that pertain to the firm. Directors on the compensation committee
determine the pay, stock options, and other benefits awarded to firm
employees, especially top management. The risk committee oversees
CEO and top management responsibilities as they pertain to credit,
market, interest rate, investment, liquidity, and reputational risk.
Finally, a nominating, or governance, committee updates the firm’s
corporate governance policies and nominates additional members to
the board of directors. Each bank in this study generally has at least
three of the four aforementioned board committees.
The nominating committee is particularly important to this study,
both because of its relationship to the CEO and because its decisions
indirectly determine the efficacy of the board by deciding who will
join the board when vacancies arise. Cai, Garner, and Walkling
(2009) observe that this committee is consequently often subject to
the “dramatic influence” of the CEO, who has a vested interest in
filling the board with friendly, insider directors (p. 2392). According
to Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010), CEOs prefer an insider
board, while the board itself prefers independence from the CEO (p.
66). This is because a CEO with an insider board is better positioned
to negotiate for higher pay or to ensure job security in the event of poor
firm performance; independent boards, on the other hand, have little
incentive to deviate from objectively monitoring firm performance. The
nominating committee also routinely nominates incumbent directors
for CEO (Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, p. 66).
Nominees to the board are submitted to shareholders for a vote once
per year. Each nominee must receive a plurality of shareholder votes
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in order to be seated on the board. Because nominating committees
and CEOs have no incentive to nominate multiple individuals for
the same director position, virtually all director nominations are
uncontested (Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 2009, p. 2392). Votes may
be cast for a director, withheld from a director, or not cast at all. In
the United States, there is no mechanism for shareholders to cast
“votes against” nominees (Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 2009, p 2396).
Thus, the plurality voting system inherently weakens the strength of
shareholders, as not voting for a nominee essentially does nothing; a
nominee in an uncontested director election requires only one vote to
win (Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 2009, p. 2390).
Therefore, securing a nomination to the board almost inevitably
ensures victory in the shareholder election. In practice, shareholders
have very limited ability to remove directors from the board, to propose
their own director nominees, or to deny nominees from assuming
office. Because of the nomination and plurality system, incumbent
directors “do not currently face any meaningful risk of being replaced”
by shareholder vote (Bebchuk, 2003, p. 1). Cai, Garner, and Walkling
(2009) also observe that incumbent directors generally always win reelection when re-nominated. A 90% margin of victory in the re-election
vote is the norm, even for poorly performing directors. This presents
a significant corporate governance problem: even though directors are
the agents of the shareholders, the shareholders are generally not
empowered to remove directors or to select or veto director-nominees.
Nonetheless, shareholders may communicate their disapproval
of poorly performing directors and firms by refusing to vote in favor
of director-nominees. As per the rules of plurality, nominees are still
seated on the board even though they may receive a low percentage
of shareholder votes in favor. However, lower margins of victory are
still undesirable for directors, as such outcomes may result in negative
publicity or embarrassment to individual directors or to their firms
(Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 2009, p. 2389).
Director turnover is desirable for shareholders, especially when
firms perform poorly. A study conducted by Schnake, Fredenberge, and
Williams (2005) found a negative correlation between board member
tenure and firm misconduct as a product of poor corporate governance
(p. 103). Long-tenured board members may, with time, become too
comfortable with the organizational status quo, thereby losing their
ability or inclination to recognize and respond to problems within the
firm. This finding also reinforces the notion that independent directors
are best equipped to objectively govern a firm.
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The frequency with which board members are subject to shareholder
re-election depends on whether a board is classified or declassified.
Classified boards are those with staggered director elections. On
such boards, only a portion of the directors—usually one-third—are
up for election each year (Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 2009, p. 2392).
Classified boards are effective at preempting takeovers in that they
require dramatic changes in firm leadership to take place over several
years. By contrast, all members of declassified boards of directors must
be re-elected each year by shareholders. Declassified boards are, by
definition, more accountable to shareholders, as they must secure reelection every year (Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 2009, p. 2411).
The aforementioned theories about fundamental governance inform
this study’s examination of shareholder sentiment and subsequent
director response during the financial crisis. Kirkpatrick (2009)
concludes that the financial crisis can be attributed in part to “failures
and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements which did
not serve their purposes to safeguard against excessive risk taking
in a number of financial services companies” (p. 61). Similar failures
in board effectiveness have been observed throughout recent history
with firms like Enron, WorldCom, Ahold, and Parmalat. Specifically,
Kirkpatrick (2009) blames the banks’ boards for ignoring warnings
issued by the International Monetary Fund and the Bank of England
regarding rising mortgage default rates, while simultaneously allowing
their firms to make widespread use of toxic mortgage-backed securities
in order to boost profits (p.64). Many banks’ boards of directors also
failed to restrict management from hiding losses through off-balancesheet accounting practices permitted by loopholes in Basel I regulations
(Kirkpatrick, 2009, p. 65).
Kirkpatrick (2009) establishes that failures in governance on
the part of boards of directors of bank holding companies may have
triggered, if not caused, the financial crisis. In theory, these directors’
actions ought to have been guided by the will and the best interests of
shareholders; by definition, directors are agents to the shareholders’
principals. Determining whether shareholders blame or penalize
bank directors and management for the financial crisis may therefore
determine the extent to which this agency problem existed during the
event and, further, may lead to the creation of new policies that could
prevent another crisis from occurring. Despite the potential benefits
of such an endeavor, there has yet to be a comprehensive event study
of shareholder sentiments toward the leadership of bank holding
companies during the financial crisis.
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This study examines shareholder votes for nominees to the boards
of directors of bank holding companies to determine whether and why
shareholders penalize the boards for the financial crisis. Cai, Garner,
and Walkling (2009) have demonstrated the effectiveness of this method
at predicting correlations between vote margins and board actions;
indeed, this study makes use of an updated version of the Institutional
Shareholder Services director election data used by Cai, Garner, and
Walkling (2009). Additionally, many studies on firm performance and
boards of directors (e.g., Cai, Garner, and Walkling [2009]; John and
Senbet [1998]; Zahra and Pearce [1998]) are not industry specific, nor
were they conducted in response to a large, macro-level event such as the
financial crisis. Schnake, Fredenberger, and Williams (2005), however,
successfully examined board composition and firm misconduct in the
financial services sector in a study that predates the financial crisis,
demonstrating that the approach used in this study is both appropriate
and timely. Indeed, it may be possible to extrapolate the findings of
this study to other firms or industries experiencing similar pervasive
economic shocks.

III. Hypotheses
The hypotheses tested in this study are informed by the
aforementioned literature, especially Cai, Garner, and Walkling
(2009), who recently conducted a comprehensive study of uncontested
director elections across all industries and found that even poorly
performing directors receive at least 90% favorable votes in regard
to their nominations. These authors also find that directors of poorly
performing firms receive a statistically significantly lower percentage
of votes for re-election. As virtually all of the major American bank
holding companies suffered decreases in profits, or losses, during
the financial crisis, our study seeks to determine the extent to which
shareholders attributed banks’ poor performance to their respective
boards of directors. In this study, shareholders are therefore assumed
to disapprove of a director when fewer than 90% of votes cast in
that election comprise “votes for” the director. We therefore expect
director approval, as measured in terms of this “votes for” percentage,
to decline each year beginning in 2007. In order to best capture the
opinion of shareholders during and after the financial crisis, we study
this phenomenon in each year from 2007 to 2010, using 2006 as a
benchmark year.
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H1a: Shareholders of bank holding companies signaled their
dissatisfaction by re-electing director-nominees by statistically
significant lower percentages over time during the financial
crisis, beginning in 2006 and declining each year through 2010.
During the crisis, for instance, shareholders may have been
more reactionary or concerned with firm preservation. By contrast,
shareholders may have been more contemplative or under less
pressure to retain directors once the economy began to stabilize in
2009 and 2010, especially with the benefit of hindsight. It is also noted
that complete data for fiscal year 2011 does not yet exist in time for
this study, as firms submit DEF-14A proxy statements to shareholders
and the Securities and Exchange Commission in March or April of the
following year.
In addition, we are also interested in comparing director election
results for banks versus non-banks during the same time period. The
financial crisis affected the value of virtually all publicly traded firms
in the United States. However, because current literature in this field
attributes the crisis itself to excessive risk-taking and governance
failures at financial services institutions, we further hypothesize that
shareholders of banks disapproved of their directors to a greater degree
than did shareholders of non-banks with respect to their own directors.
The results of this hypothesis will allow us to determine whether lower
bank director vote percentages, if they occurred, were unique to the
financial services industry.
H1b: Bank directors received statistically significant lower
re-election percentages versus their colleagues on non-bank
boards during the financial crisis, beginning in 2006 and
declining each year through 2010.
Furthermore, if bank shareholders did in fact disapprove of
incumbent directors’ performance, the outcome of each election may
be predicted by the characteristics of each nominee or the state of the
firm or the firm’s board. The aforementioned literature suggests that
shareholders are typically deliberate and thoughtful when casting their
votes for directors during periods of crisis. For example, shareholders
may have been more likely to vote against incumbent directors who
were in charge during the financial crisis (a period of drastically
poor firm performance), or those with comparatively longer board
tenures or membership on important board committees. Additionally,
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shareholders may have penalized directors on classified boards or
certain board committees, or directors with particular professional or
academic backgrounds. They also may have penalized directors when
the firm’s stock price decreased since the previous director election.
Such a scenario would imply that shareholders may have taken these
characteristics into account when casting their votes in director
elections.
H2: Individual bank director election outcomes during the
financial crisis were determined by firm, board, and individual
nominee characteristics.

IV. Methodology and Data
The sample of banks chosen for this study begins with the United
States Federal Reserve’s list of the top 50 domestic bank holding
companies by assets, which is publicly available and continuously
updated on the Internet. Twelve banks that are not publicly listed and
those that are not domiciled in the United States were excluded from
the sample, both to control for regulations and governance standards,
as well as to ensure a uniform dataset. Finally, we excluded two banks
for which director election vote data was unavailable from Institutional
Shareholder Services, for a total of 35 firms. Together, these firms
control approximately $13 trillion in assets (“Top 50 Banks,” 2012).
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) provided data on the votes
cast in individual director elections from 2006 to 2010 for 1,882 publicly
traded firms. This data includes firm name; director name; vote margin
requirement; election date; total outstanding shares; and total votes
cast for, withheld, and in abstention. We extracted from this dataset
the aforementioned 36 banks (1,673 separate bank director elections)
chosen as the study’s sample for hypotheses H1a and H2. Hypothesis
H1b compares the sample of 36 banks to the remaining 1,857 nonbanks (42,928 separate non-bank director elections) for which director
election data is also available. The time period in question for this
study is 2007 to 2010, with 2006 as the benchmark year. A complete
list of each bank used in this study is included in Figure 1: Sample of
the Top Public American Bank Holding Companies.
Information regarding director characteristics was manually
collected from DEF-14A “Definitive Proxy Statements,” which are posted
for public access on the Security and Exchange Commission’s Internet-
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based EDGAR database. These statements are sent to shareholders
each year ahead of annual shareholder meetings, and shareholders are
able to submit their votes on various issues, including director elections,
back to the firm by ballot if they are not able to attend the meeting in
person. This newly collected data was accordingly added to the director
election data from ISS. We also collected data regarding CEO and
board turnover from DEF-14A statements in order to get a complete,
descriptive understanding of changes in firm leadership during and
after the financial crisis. A summary of this data is presented in Figure
2: Overall Average Board Turnover; Figure 3: Overall Average Board
Size; Figure 4: CEO Turnover by Year; and Figure 5: Director Turnover
by Board Type (see Appendix I).
Each bank’s stock price on the day of the shareholder meeting to
elect directors was collected from Yahoo! Finance. We calculated the
change in the stock price from the previous election, and added this
information to each item of director election data from ISS. We further
plotted these stock prices against the aforementioned data regarding
board turnover and changes in board size, both for individual firms
and the entire sample of 36 banks. These charts suggest that during
the financial crisis there may have been a negative correlation between
stock price (as a proxy for firm performance) and board turnover.
Again, these descriptive statistics reinforce the methodology behind
our hypothesis formulation, and suggest that other firm, board, or
director-specific variables may have influenced shareholders’ votes.
A synopsis of average changes in our sample firms’ stock prices and
board changes can be found in Figure 6: Stock Price vs. Board Changes
in Appendix I.
To further enhance our descriptive analysis, this study collects data
on director, CEO, and top management compensation packages from
the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) ExecuComp database.
Compensation amounts are listed as fair market values and are sorted
into various categories, including salary/cash, bonus, stock, options,
pension, and restricted shares. The sum of all categories is also taken.
This data was collected in the event that it might prove useful in the
formulation of additional hypotheses pertaining to director votes and
changes in compensation. We observe that directors and top managers
alike experienced a sharp decrease in compensation during the financial
crisis, suggesting that they may have been penalized in other, nonfinancial ways, including in terms of election percentages. Summaries
of this data are presented in Appendix I, and include Figure 7: Bank
Director Compensation; Figure 8: Top Management Compensation;
and Figure 9: Bank CEO Compensation.

58

Fordham Business Student Research Journal

We used Stata 12, a statistical analysis program, to test our
hypotheses. In order to test for statistical differences in mean and
median shareholder vote percentages in H1a and H1b, we run twosample t and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, respectively.
To determine which firm, board, and director characteristics
contributed to the percentage of votes cast in favor of director nominees,
if any (H2), we run ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regressions.

V. Data Analysis and Potential Contributions
This study examines 1,673 bank director elections from 2007 to
2010 on both classified and non-classified boards, using 2006 as a
benchmark year. The distribution of the elections, by year and board
type, is summarized in Table I.
Table I: Sample of bank director elections by year and board type
This table lists the number of bank director elections for each year
in this study. Column two lists the number of director elections on nonclassified boards, and column three lists the number of elections on
classified boards, with a total in column 4.

Of the 476 individual bank directors in this study between 2006
and 2010, 146 directors were replaced, thereby implying a 30.6%
turnover rate across these five years. Toward the end and after the
financial crisis, directors of non-classified boards tended to be replaced
at an increasingly faster rate, while the opposite trend is observed
for bank directors on classified boards, as seen in Table II. However,
the decrease in the classified board director turnover rate after the
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financial crisis can probably be attributed to the fact that many
boards elected to declassify themselves—effectively making the boards
more accountable to shareholders but subjecting themselves to more
frequent elections—during and after the event. Indeed, if a director on
a classified board received less than 90% of the vote for election during
a particular year, that director’s board declassified itself later that year
12% of the time. Of the 19 classified bank boards in our sample at
the beginning of 2006, nine of them eventually declassified themselves
by the end of 2010. Similarly, if a director received less than 90% of
the vote for election during a particular year, that director’s board
size decreased later that year 25% of the time. A decrease in board
size, as previously mentioned, is generally considered advantageous
to shareholders, as smaller boards tend to be more accountable and
active monitors of firm performance. Table II describes the distribution
of instances of bank director turnover.
Table II: Instances of bank director turnover
This table describes the number of times an incumbent bank director
was not renominated despite being eligible for renomination each year.
The results are separated by board classification type. The first column of
each classification category indicates the number of such directors, while
the second column expresses that number as a proportion of the total
number of director elections that took place during the previous year.

It is worth noting that not one of the 1,673 bank director elections in
this study resulted in the failure of a nominee to secure election at the
hands of shareholders. Nominees were withdrawn in only two separate
instances (before shareholders could cast their votes). Further, the votes
of 11 CIT Group Inc. director elections were not disclosed. Otherwise, all
bank director nominees were elected.
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Table III lists the number of times director-nominees, both from the
bank sample and from all other firms in the larger population, were
elected with fewer than 90% of votes cast in favor, indicating shareholder
disapproval. These descriptive results from Table III indicate that
shareholders strongly disapproved of bank board members during and
after the financial crisis; hypothesis H1 will test to determine whether
these changes in approval are statistically significant. To reiterate, in
this study, shareholders are assumed to disapprove of directors when
fewer than 90% of votes cast in a director election comprise “votes for”
the director.
Table III: Instances of shareholder disapproval of directors
(banks and all other firms)
This table describes the number of times directors were elected with
fewer than 90% of votes cast in favor, and are separated first by banks and
non-banks, and then by board classification type. For each classification
type, column 1 counts the number of times shareholders received less
than 90% of the votes cast in favor, and column 2 lists that number as a
percentage of the total director elections that took place during that year.

This study also observes 23 instances of a bank in our sample
changing its CEO between 2006 and 2010; therefore, 56% of the CEOs
in this study’s sample of bank holding companies lost their jobs during
or after the financial crisis. Summaries of this data are presented in
Apendix I, and include Figure 2: Overall Average Board Turnover;
Figure 3: Overall Average Board Size; Figure 4: CEO Turnover by Year;
and Figure 5: Director Turnover by Board Type. Table IV illustrates
how many CEOs retained their positions between given years during
and after the financial crisis; less than half of the individual CEOs who
were managing our sample’s 36 banks in 2007 retained their positions
by the beginning of 2011.
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Table IV: Number of bank CEOs who retained their jobs
from Year Y to Year X
This table lists the number of times a CEO who was in office at
the end of the shareholder election meeting in Year Y retained his or
her job by the same time in Year X. The results are separated by year.
For each year, the number of CEOs to retain their positions is listed
in column 1. Column 2 expresses this number as a proportion of the
number of individual CEOs who were in office during Year Y. As an
example, 24, or 64.8%, of the CEOs in 2007 retained their position
by the shareholder election meeting in 2010. There are 37 CEOs
across the 36 banks in our sample; Hancock Holding Company has
two co-CEOs.

The results of testing hypothesis H1
Hypothesis H1a asserts that the percentage of shareholder votes
cast in favor of bank director nominees decreased in a statistically
significant way during and after the financial crisis. Specifically, we seek
to determine whether affirmative vote percentages decreased beginning
in 2007 through 2010 relative to 2006. In order to test this hypothesis, we
run a separate two-sample, one-tail t-test for each of the sample means
for each time period in question, using the mean proportion of votes cast
in favor from 2006 as a benchmark. This method tests whether the actual
mean for each given time period is statistically less than the benchmark
year’s mean in 2006. Table V summarizes the results of each t-test.
Table V: Bank director nominee affirmative vote percentage:
two-sample t-test
This table lists the results of a two-sample t-test to determine
whether the mean proportion of votes cast in favor of all bank director-
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nominees for each year is statistically less than the same metric in the
base year (2006). Column 2 lists the number of bank director elections in
the given year. Column 3 describes the mean proportion of votes cast in
favor. The subsequent three columns list the p-value for each difference
of means, where column 4 tests whether the mean of the year in question
is statistically greater than the benchmark year; column 5 tests whether
the mean of the year in question and that of the benchmark year are
statistically equal; and column 6 tests whether the mean of the year in
question is statistically less than the benchmark year. A p-value below
0.01 indicates significance at the 1% level.

The small p-values of each t-test enable us to accept H1a for 2008, 2009,
and 2010. Directors of American banks during those years experienced a
statistically higher rate of shareholder dissatisfaction when they ran for
election or re-election.
Additionally, we run a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test to
determine whether the differences between median affirmative vote
means are statistically significant, as summarized below in Table VI
Table VI: Bank director nominee affirmative vote percentage:
rank-sum test for median difference
This table reports data on the average percentage of votes cast in
favor of the bank director-nominee for each year from 2007 to 2010. The
second column reports the number of bank director-nominees elected
each year and the third column reports the average percentage votes
in favor of the nominee. Column four reports the Wilcoxon-z rank-sum
score testing for a difference in the median between the percentage of
votes in favor in the year compared to the average votes cast in favor
of bank nominees in 2006, two years prior to the crisis year. The last
column reports the p-values of the rank-sum test column; p-values below
0.01 indicate significance at the 1% level.
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The differences between median affirmative vote means are
statistically significant for each year, confirming our decision to accept
H1a. We therefore conclude that bank directors received statistically
fewer proportions of affirmative votes both during and after the financial
crisis for 2008, 2009, and 2010.
H1b asserts that bank directors received statistically significant lower
re-election percentages versus their colleagues on non-bank boards
during 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010. We run the same t-tests to test the
differences between mean votes in favor of bank directors versus nonbank directors, using 42,928 director elections across 1,873 other publicly
traded firms from 2006 to 2010 as our sample for the latter. The results
are summarized in Table VII.
Table VII: Bank director-nominee affirmative vote percentages,
banks vs. non-banks
This table compares the average percentage of votes cast in favor
of bank director-nominees for each year with the same metric for nonbank directors in our sample. Columns 2 and 4 list the number of bank
and non-bank director elections, respectively. Columns 3 and 5 display
the average percentage of votes cast in favor of bank directors and nonbank directors, respectively. The subsequent columns list the p-values for
tests for statistical differences between these two means. Column 4 tests
whether the mean for bank directors is statistically less than the mean
for non-bank directors; column 5 tests whether there is no statistical
difference between the two means; and column 6 tests whether the mean
for bank directors is statistically greater than the mean for non-bank
directors. A p-value below 0.01 indicates significance at the 1% level.
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We therefore observe that shareholders of non-banks approved of
their directors more than did shareholders of banks during 2006 and
2007, before the financial crisis. However, during and after the financial
crisis (2008 to 2010), we cannot conclude with statistical confidence
whether the means of shareholder votes in favor for director nominees
was different. H1b is therefore rejected.
The results of testing hypothesis H2
Hypothesis H2 asserts that the percentage of shareholder votes
cast in favor of bank director-nominees during the financial crisis can
be accurately predicted based upon certain firm, board, or individual
director characteristics. Several of the descriptive statistics previously
mentioned, as well as current literature in this field, inform our decision
to incorporate the independent variables used in the multiple regressions
to be used to test for these relationships. For example, as displayed in
Tables VIII, IX, and X, committee membership and board tenure may
have been a factor in board turnover and shareholder disapproval of
directors.
Table VIII: Bank director turnover by committee membership
This table describes the distribution of bank director turnover by
board classification type and committee (audit committee, compensation
committee, and government committee) for each year. A bank director is
said to have “turned over” if he or she was not renominated, despite being
eligible, during each year in question.
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Table IX: Average consecutive board tenure of retiring bank
directors by committee membership
This table is an extension of Table VIII and displays the average
tenure of the bank directors on each committee at the time of their
separation from the board. Only directors who have “turned over” are
counted toward this average. A bank director is said to have “turned over”
if he or she was not renominated, despite being eligible, during each year
in question.

Table X: Number of unpopular bank directors (<90% shareholder
support) by board committee
This table is an extension of Table VIII and displays the number of
unpopular bank directors on each committee during the given year. A
director is said to be “unpopular” or “disapproved of” by shareholders if
he or she received less than 90% of the votes cast in favor of his or her
nomination to the board during that year.

Accordingly, the independent variables included in the testing of this
hypothesis include the following about each director nominee, where
applicable: board tenure in years; whether the nominee was in office
during the financial crisis (2007 or 2008); committee membership (audit,
governance, and/or nominating committees); whether or not the board
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was classified at the time of the election; the percent change in the firm’s
stock price since the previous director election; whether the nominee
had any prior experience in business or the financial services industry;
whether the nominee had previously served as a CEO, CFO, or director
of a firm; the number of previous directorships the nominee had held;
special professional experience (as an academic, a legal professional, or
an elected or appointed member of the government); and whether the
nominee was determined to be “independent” of the firm, as per SEC law.
Several models are proposed in our OLS regressions below. Model
1 takes into account only firm performance and director tenure
characteristics. Model 2 is an expansion of Model 1 and includes directornominee board committee membership, as well as whether or not the
board is classified. Model 3 is also an expansion of Model 1, and includes
director professional and educational characteristics. Model 4 is a
combination of Models 2 and 3, and Model 5 includes year effects. These
various models allow us to partially accept H2 on the basis of the multiple
regression analysis presented in Table XI.
Table XI: Multiple regression analysis of the percentage
of votes in favor of bank directors
This table shows the results of a multiple ordinary least squares
regression analysis of the percentage of votes in favor of the bank directornominee. The dependent variable is the average percent of “for” votes
of all directors being elected in a bank for each year. The independent
variables are board tenure in years; whether the nominee was in office
during the financial crisis (2007 or 2008); committee membership (audit,
governance, and/or nominating committees); whether or not the board
was classified at the time of the election; the percent change in the firm’s
stock price since the previous director election; whether the nominee
had any prior experience in business or the financial services industry;
whether the nominee had previously served as a CEO, CFO, or director
of a firm; the number of previous directorships the nominee had held;
special professional experience (as an academic, a legal professional, or
an elected or appointed member of the government); and whether the
nominee was determined to be “independent” of the firm, as per SEC law.
Appendix II defines each independent variable in greater detail. Various
regression models are shown, with coefficients in bold and p-values in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
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In the above models, we consider any variable with a p-value less
than 0.10 to be statistically significant, and adopt Model 5 as our primary
model due to its comparatively large R-Squared coefficient. Therefore,
we conclude that shareholders tended to penalize bank directors for each
year of incumbency, for having prior experience in government or the
law, and for being an independent of the firm. Conversely, shareholders
tended to favor directors who were in charge during the crisis, for serving
on the board’s nominating committee, and for positive percent changes
in stock price. We cannot conclude with statistical confidence that the
other independent variables in this model accurately predict shareholder
sentiment toward the directors of the firms in this sample. These results
are discussed in the following section.
With an overall p-value of zero to four decimal places, the model itself
is statistically significant. Approximately 36% of the variability in the
proportion of shareholder votes cast in favor of each director is accounted
for by the model.
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VI. Discussion, Limitations, and Conclusions
Discussion
The hypothesis tests and regressions performed in this study confirm
several important features of bank director elections during and after the
financial crisis. Primarily, we observe that the directors of bank boards
received statistically fewer shareholder votes in favor as a proportion of
total votes cast in their annual, or semi-annual, uncontested elections.
Meanwhile, Kirkpatrick (2009) establishes that failures in governance
on the part of boards of directors of bank holding companies may have
triggered, if not caused, the financial crisis. This study’s findings,
coupled with Kirkpatrick (2009), strongly suggest that shareholders do
in fact penalize bank boards for the financial crisis. Notably, however,
shareholder disapproval seemed to be stronger after, and not during,
the event, which this study defines as occurring in 2007 and 2008.
Accordingly, shareholders’ attitudes toward directors during times of
macroeconomic or industry-wide crisis may not be observable until
several years have elapsed. It is also plausible that shareholders may
prefer director continuity during times of crisis, but are willing to expel
or signal their disapproval of directors once the crisis has largely passed.
Bank shareholders likely took several aforementioned individual,
board, and firm-wide factors into account. Notably, however, our model
suggests that shareholders penalized independent directors and yet
preferred directors who were in charge during the crisis. These seemingly
counterintuitive outcomes may be explained by board turnover. It is likely
that directors who performed especially poorly in the eyes of shareholders
were not renominated or resigned from their boards rather than running
for re-election. As a consequence, shareholders may not have been able
to formally render a verdict on especially poor directors. Nonetheless,
shareholders tended to penalize long-serving directors, which confirms
the findings of Schnake, Fredenberge, and Williams (2005). However, if a
director was not replaced after the financial crisis, he or she seems to be
performing relatively better than new directors.
This study has several important policy implications. In terms of
corporate governance policy, it is likely that bank shareholders desire
a stronger mechanism to remove poorly performing directors and
nominate new people to these important positions. Despite the fact that
shareholders disapproved of 76% of bank director-nominees in 2010, only
9% of those directors were not renominated in 2011. The agency problem
inherent between shareholders and boards of directors may be mitigated
if directors become more vulnerable to shareholder disapproval. Perhaps
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shareholders should be permitted to usurp board-nominating committees
and put forth director-nominees of their own when directors fail to amass
a particular percentage of votes in favor (say, for example, less than 80%
or 90%).
Limitations
Data for this study was rather limited, and focused only on director
elections from 2006 to 2010, for a total of five distinct years. The effects
of the financial crisis have not entirely passed. Further research on
this topic may seek to look at years prior to 2006 and after 2010 for a
more complete understanding of the financial crisis’s effects on bank
shareholders, boards, and management. Moreover, this study did not
take into account firms that collapsed or merged with other firms. For
example, firms like Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers
were not part of the sample. These exclusions were made in order to
ensure uniformity in the data; care was taken to be sure that the data
for each firm in the sample could speak to shareholder sentiment before,
during, and after the financial crisis. Finally, the OLS regressions used
in this study did not include individual or average director compensation,
suggesting a possible avenue for future studies on this event. The models
and methods offered in this study may also facilitate additional research
on the behavior of shareholders and directors of firms within industries
suffering from similar pervasive crises, such as the American automotive
industry crisis of 2008 to 2010.
Conclusion
This study determined that shareholders of American bank holding
companies penalized the members of the firms’ boards of directors for
the financial crisis during the 2008, 2009, and 2010 board election cycles.
However, directors of non-bank holding companies also lost similar levels
of shareholder support during the same period of time. Nonetheless, our
empirical analysis with data on director elections and characteristics has
allowed us to conclude with confidence that shareholders took into account
director tenure, experience in government or law, independence from the
bank, membership on the firm’s nominating committee, and changes in
stock price when evaluating directors vis-à-vis director election votes.
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Appendix I: Figures

Figure 1: Sample of the Top Public American Bank Holding Companies
Source: National Information Center, Federal Reserve System
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Figure 2: Overall Average Board Turnover
Source: Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval System
(EDGAR), U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Figure 3: Overall Average Board Size
Source: Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval System
(EDGAR), U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
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Figure 4: CEO Turnover by Year
Source: Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval System
(EDGAR), U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Figure 5: Director Turnover by Board Type
Source: Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval
System (EDGAR), U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and
Institutional Shareholder Services
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Figure 6: Stock Price vs. Board Changes
Note: Data points are averages across this study’s sample of 36 firms.
Source: Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval
System (EDGAR), U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and
Institutional Shareholder Services

Figure 7: Bank Director Compensation
Source: Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS)
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Figure 8: Bank Top Management Compensation
Source: Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS)

Figure 9: Bank CEO Compensation
Source: Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS)
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Figure 10: Top Management Compensation
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Appendix II: Variable Definitions
%Δ in Current Stock Price is the difference between the opening stock
price on the date of the current year’s shareholder proxy meeting and
the opening stock price on the date of the previous year’s shareholder
proxy meeting, divided by the previous year’s opening stock price.
Academic Background is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that
the director nominee has served in a full-time academic role at, for
example, a university or think tank; and/or has obtained a Ph.D. or
other advanced academic degree.
Audit Committee is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the
director-nominee is currently a member of that firm’s audit committee,
a committee of the board that is generally responsible for ensuring that
the firm’s financial statements are accurate.
Board Tenure is the number of years the director has served on this
board. It also includes non-consecutive years served.
Business Background is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that
the director-nominee has previously worked for a for-profit institution.
Classified Board is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that members
of the firm’s board are divided into three groups, or “classes,” each of
which serves three-year terms before needing to be renominated.
Compensation Committee is a dummy variable where 1 indicates
that the director-nominee is currently a member of that firm’s
compensation committee, a committee of the board which is generally
responsible for determining the compensation packages of top
management and members of the board.
Director During Crisis is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that
the director was on the bank’s board during the financial crisis of 2007
and 2008.
Financial Services Background is a dummy variable where 1
indicates that the director-nominee has previously worked for a forprofit institution in the financial services industry.
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Government Background is a dummy variable where 1 indicates
that the director-nominee has previously served in the public sector,
including the Federal Reserve System or elected office.
Independent Director is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that
the director-nominee is independent of firm management, as per SEC
laws.
Legal Background is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the
director-nominee has obtained a Juris Doctor degree and/or has worked
in the legal field.
Nominating Committee is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that
the director-nominee is currently a member of that firm’s nominating
committee, a committee of the board that is generally responsible for
submitting director-nominees to shareholders each year.
Number of Other Directorships is the number of other boards that
a director-nominee has previously served on or is currently serving on
at the time of his or her nomination to the bank’s board.
Prior CEO Experience is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that
the director-nominee has served as the chief executive officer of a firm.
Prior CFO Experience is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that
the director-nominee has served as the chief financial officer of a firm.
Prior Director Experience is a dummy variable where 1 indicates
that the director-nominee has previously served as a member of the
board of directors of another firm at some point in his or her career.
Vote For Percentage is the average percent of “for” votes of all
directors being elected in a company. It is calculated by dividing the
number of “for” votes for each director divided by the total number of
votes cast in that director election.

